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Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook
Brad J. Kallenberg
University of Dayton, 2011

In an otherwise superbly edited compilation of student notes from Wittgenstein’s
1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cora Diamond makes an false step that
reveals to us our own tendencies to misread Wittgenstein. The student notes she collated
attributed the following remark to a student named Watson: “The point is that these
[data] tables do not by themselves determine that one builds the bridge in this way: only
the tables together with certain scientific theory determine that.”1 But Diamond thinks
this a mistake, presuming instead to change the manuscript and put these words into the
mouth of Wittgenstein. But to make such a change shows a lamentable, even if
commonplace, ignorance of engineering. Diamond apparently shares this ignorance with
Watson, and presumably with most of us as well, especially those of us who are educated
in math and science, because this education makes us think we understand engineering

1

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgensein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge, 1939:
From the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Normal Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, ed. Cora Diamond
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 110.

by extension. But we do not. I intend to show why Wittgenstein the former engineer
could never have made the remark Diamond wants to attribute to him. The reasons why
not drastically undermine the myth of Wittgensteinian fideism and have bearing on the
manner of our conversations about religious pluralism.

Part I. Wittgenstein’s engineering outlook
Just prior to the famous conclusion the third Lecture on Religious Belief (1939)—”the
whole weight may be in the picture” (72)—Wittgenstein is reported as having said
something most opaque. The discussion is about pictures of God. Suddenly Wittgenstein
says, “we could, under certain circumstances, have one projection of an ellipse drawn
instead of another” (71). What in the world does an ellipse have to do with God? As
readers, we are tempted to skip over this remark in an attempt to follow the “real” thread
of the conversation—in this case, various picturings of “God.” It is my contention that this
remark, and others like it, ought not be skipped over. Together they constitute evidence
of an enduring conceptual backdrop against which Wittgenstein’s thinking makes sense,
namely his training in turn-of-the-century German engineering. I shall argue this
background is determinative for rightly reading certain passages. More specifically, I shall
argue that Wittgenstein’s biography drastically undercuts the so-called fideism he is said
to exemplify.2

2

Nielsen defines “fideism” this way: “There is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher
(or for that matter anyone else) can relevantly criticize whole modes of discourse or, what comes to the
same thing, ways of life, for each mode of discourse has its own specific criteria of rationality/irrationality,
intelligibility/ unintelligibility and reality/unreality.” Kai Nielsen, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” Philosophy
XLII, no. 161 (1967): 22. See also Kai Nielsen and D. Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism? (London: SCM,
2005).
2

The strategy I will not take is that of putting on thick spectacles in order to more
precisely exegete passages of the Investigations and so lay bare what Wittgenstein really
meant.3 Rather, my strategy will be to consider Wittgenstein through the lens of
biography.4 My focus will be that singular aspect of Wittgenstein’s life that everyone
seems happiest to skip over: his education in engineering.5

3

For recent books on “plain sense” approach, see Robert J. Fogelin, Taking Wittgenstein at His Word:
A Textual Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at His
Word (New York: Continuum, 2004). Although I am generally in favor of such a strategy for clarifying
natural readings, people far smarter than I have launched several “New Wittgenstein” schools that seem to
have rich and fascinating research programs regardless of whether they uncover Wittgenstein’s real
meaning. If meaning is in the use, and Wittgenstein’s own words are susceptible to multiple uses, then the
exegetical approach seems unpromising for settling things between rival possible means. See Alice Crary
and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (New York, NY: Routledge,2000); Timothy McCarthy and
Sean C. Stidd, eds., Wittgenstein in America (Oxford: Clarendon Press,2001).
4
The publication of Monk’s powerful biography reminded us that whatever role Frege’s ideas play in
the Tractatus, it was the concrete conversations with Frank Ramsey and the rude gesture by Piero Sraffa
(“What is the logical form of that?!” pp. 260-261) that constituted the pivots for his later philosophy.
Anyone who has carefully read the biographies of McGuinness or Monk or the conversations and
correspondence with Drury or Engelmann can attest to the illumination these bring to otherwise opaque
themes. Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990). In addition
to Monk’s biography see, James C. Klagge, ed. Wittgenstein: Biography & Philosophy (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press,2001); Béla Szabados, Ludwig Wittgenstein on Race, Gender and Cultural
Identity (Edwin Mellen, 2010). See also M. O’C. Drury, “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein”
and “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 1984); Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir; (Oxford,
UK: Blackwell, 1967); Brian McGuinness, ed. Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Volume 1)
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,1988).
5
Important exceptions to this “skipping over” include Kelly Hamilton, “Wittgenstein and the Mind’s
Eye,” in Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, ed. James C. Klagge (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Kelly Hamilton, “Some Philosophical Consequences of Wittgenstein’s Aeronautical
Research,” Perspectives on Science 9, no. 1 (2001); Kelly Hamilton, “Darstellungen in the Principles of
Mechanics and the Tractatus: The Representation of Objects in Relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein,”
Perspectives on Science 10, no. 1 (2002); Susan G. Sterrett, “Physical Pictures: Engineering Models Circa 1914
and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in History of Philosophy of Science: New Trends and Perspectives, ed.
Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002); Susan G.
Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World (New York: Pi Press,
2006); Mark Wilson, “Wittgenstein: Physica Sunt, Non Leguntur,” Philosophical Topics 25, no. 2 (1997);
Alfred Nordmann, “Another New Wittgenstein: The Scientific and Engineering Background of the
Tractatus,” Perspectives on Science 10, no. 3 (2002).
3

At the 1876 World’s Fair, German engineering was unilaterally deemed “cheap and
bad,” even by the Germans themselves.6 Courageously, in the quarter century that
followed, the German engineering society (Verein Deutsche Ingenieure, or VDI)
reinvented the German school system, inserting between the vo-tech school system
(Fachschulen) and the university-prep system (Gymnasium) a new kind of prep school
system, technische Hochschulen.
The educational revolution hinged on four correctives.7 First, from 1884 onward, a
year of shop training was required as a prerequisite for admission to a technische
Hochschule. Second, there followed a “de-emphasis of calculus in favor of less precise but
more pragmatic graphic methods.” (This was to develop into a full blown “antimathematics” movement among engineering educators.) Third, laboratories were
reintroduced as the means for both empirical research and hands-on training.8 Finally,
there was a tremendous expansion of instruction over the topics of design (rather than
theory) and graphical drawing techniques (rather than numerical analysis or
mathematical proofs).9 So complete was the shift from scholasticism to hands-on training
that some complained the reform movement had gone too far.

6

Franz Reuleaux, of “kinematics alphabet” fame, served as the director of Berlin’s Industrial Institute
th
and was perhaps Germany’s leading 19 -century authority on technological development, attended the
World’s Fair in Philadelphia and reported back to Germany in the form of ten letters that were published in
the National Times (Nationalzeitung) the summer of 1876. He traced German technology’s “momentous
defeat” in Philadelphia to the fact that German industry is governed by a basic principle: “Cheap and bad.”
Kees Gispen, New Profession, Old Order; Engineers and German Society, 1815-1914 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 116.
7
Ibid., 153.
8
Think of all the times Wittgenstein complained that his hands were too course to mend the spider
web.
9
“Students were made to spend long hours in the drafting rooms of the technische Hochschulen ,
learning how to become practical designers and do the work of ordinary draftsmen, in order to develop
4

In Berlin, laboratory and drafting hours went from roughly 35 percent of the
total time devoted to instruction in 1881-2 to 45 percent in 1886-7, 48 percent in
1888-9 and 1885-6, and over 70 percent in 1898-9.10
Wittgenstein attended technische Hochschule from 1906-1908. In 1908, the Wright
Brothers toured Europe with their flying contraption. The next thing we know is that
Wittgenstein had enrolled in a doctoral program in aeronautical engineering at
Manchester. These facts may chafe against the image we have of Wittgenstein the
eccentric logician. But consider the fact that as a precocious child, this same Wittgenstein
built (from wood!) a working sewing machine at age 12, designed a variable volume
combustion chamber and patented a jet-fuelled propeller at age 22, repaired machinery at
a local factory (using only synchronized vibration!) when he lived in Norway in his early
thirties, meticulously designed and oversaw the construction of a Bauhaus home for his
sister at age 35, and at age 54 built a an apparatus for recording blood pressure for a wartime hospital.11 It is in light of his engineer’s “eye” that passages in the Nachlaß must be
read. In what follows, I will offer three components of his engineering outlook that help
us see why fideism was very unlikely to have been his perspective on religious pluralism:
methods of projection, dynamical similarity, and satisfactoriness.

1. Methods of projection

their powers of spatial conceptualization and shed erroneous notions about the easy road to success….”
Gispen, 156.
10
Ibid., 102. Emphasis added.
11
{McGuinness, 1988 #2623@45, 68-69} {Monk, 1990 #2630@197} {Leitner, 1995 #4944} {Henderson,
1973 #7424@190}
5

In PI §115, Wittgenstein confesses “A picture held us captive.”12 As one familiar with
engineering training, Wittgenstein is rightly worried about being captivated by a picture.
Ordinarily, when we encounter the word ‘picture’ we think “first and foremost of
something drawn or painted and, say, hung on a wall.”13 But pictures played a special role
in the training of engineers. By the time Wittgenstein attended technische Hochschule in
1906, nearly three-quarters of the educational instruction was devoted to hands-on work.
Chief among these was graphical drawing techniques (a much more complex form of
“drafting” than we normally think of). Students spent hundreds of hours drawing
mechanisms, for example mechanisms moving by increments through various “possible”
positions. Of course, “possible” with respect to a drawing and “possibility” in real practice
are two different things. What captivates the students at the early stage is the idea that
the “possibility” of a mechanism’s motion was like an occult force that overshadowed the
mechanism, guaranteeing the manner of its motion. But this is all rubbish from the
vantage of an actual practitioner: “We talk as if these parts could only move in this way,
as if they could not do anything else. How is this—do we forget the possibility of their
binding, breaking off, melting, and so on?”14 For this reason, students must be broken of
their unwitting allegiance to a faulty, though ideal, picture. On the one hand, there is the
picture that is drawn, and on the other hand a different picture governing the use of
drawings. It was this second picture, the one governing use, that Wittgenstein worried
12

“ And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably.”
13
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939:
From the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, ed. Cora Diamond,
Chicago (University of Chicago Press1975), 240.
14
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), §193.
6

about. If captivity to the ideal-use picture is not broken, the student will never succeed as
an engineer. Nevertheless, the time students spend drawing mechanisms are valuable,
because by them they cultivate mastery in language of two dimensional representation
and therefore, of being able to respond appropriately to those drawings rendered by
others. At first, the student must “interpret” another’s drawing, and do so haltingly. But
the highly skilled are said to read technical drawing as effortlessly as you read this
sentence.15
The idea that there are various kinds of pictures indicates that there are correlative
kinds of skills needed to use them.
What we call ‘descriptions’ [Beschreibungen] are instruments for particular
uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with
measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as
a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to
think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray
how a thing looks, what it is like.16
No picture comes prepackaged with automatic applicator. (If it did it would be a
“super-picture.”17) Rather, the skill set required to render or read a picture is called a
“method of projection.” This also is an engineering term, though in concept it is quite
simple, even if the skill set is difficult to master. The simplest skill set to master

15

In the Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein reproduces the sketch by which someone (likely, his
father) thought to propose a perpetual motion machine. The illusion comes from the poorly drawn sketch.
If standard kinematics diagramming is applied, the “machine” quickly reveals itself as either rigid or
unhinged (depending on decisions that diagramming forces one to make explicit). The bewitchment comes
from the way the mind supplies the revolute joint here while assuming the slider to be fixed and the then
supplies the slider while assuming the revolute to be fixed…. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1974), 194.
16
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 291.
17
Wittgenstein works very hard to disabuse his students of the myth of “super-pictures.” Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 67.
7

Wittgenstein calls a “technique.” (Wittgenstein does not disparage “technique,” for
novices must begin somewhere. But, as we shall see momentarily, there are some skill sets
of picture-usage that are extremely complex, difficult to master and in fact cannot be
mastered without the assistance of others.18
For there may be many different techniques of comparison and many different
kinds of resemblance. For instance, one thing may be said to resemble another
if it is a projection of it; but there are many different modes of projection—of
representing an object.19
In the simplest instance, an engineering students would have understood “method
of projection” as an orthogonal projection as famously set out by Albrecht Dürer.20

This technique, easy enough even for the novice to begin to get the hang of, enabled a
student to construct alternate views as if the object were incrementally rotated in space
by, say, 24 degrees:

18

In the field of medicine, physicians must learn to read x-rays. See Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 106.
19
Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939: From
the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, 69. Emphasis added.
20
Dürer’s drawings can be seen in Peter Jeffrey Booker, A History of Engineering Drawing (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1963).
8

Students also became familiar with non-orthogonal projection, as when a circle viewed
from various angles takes an elliptical appearance. So, ellipses can be projected onto a
circle and vice versa. With a little thought students might devise a way to project a square
onto a circle, until finally anything can be projected onto anything.21
But now consider the puzzle of the following table:
X

Y

3

2.99

3

0.01

3

1.00

3

.77

3

1.75

21

“Suppose we were set the task of projecting figures of various shapes on a given plane I into a plane
II. We could then fix a method of projection (say orthogonal projection) and carry out the mapping in
accordance with it. We could also easily make inferences from the representations on plane II about figures
on plane I. But we could also adopt another procedure: we might decide that the representations in the
second plane should all be circles, no matter what the copied figures in the first plane might be. (Perhaps
this is the most convenient form of representation for us.) That is, different forms on I are mapped onto II
by different methods of projection. In order in this case to construe the circles in II as representations of the
figures in I, I shall have to give the method of projection for each circle; the mere fact that a figure in I is
represented by a circle in II by itself tells us nothing about the shape of the figure copied. That an image in
II is a circle is just the established norm of our mapping. –Well, the same thing happens when we depict
reality in our language in accordance with the subject-predicate form. The subject-predicate form serves as
a projection of countless different logical forms.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 204-05.
9

What conceivable method of projection maps X onto Y? Since the relationship is not 1-1
onto, we immediately suspect there is no such method of projection. In fact, this table
represents the conversion of distances on a globe (x) and their respective distances on a
Mercator projection map (y), where distances at the margins collapse sinusoidally.
In the case of the Mercator projection, of course, if one knows the technique and the
location relative to the center longitude, one can follow what is going on. In Lectures on
the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein gives two additional examples. But in each
example there is simply no “trick” as there is for Dürer or Mercator. The first example
involves the geometrical construction of a heptacaidecagon. The second example will
begin the next section of this paper.
After sketching the geometrical construction of a pentagon,

Wittgenstein poses the following order: “Here is the construction for five [-sided
polygon], now do the same, the analogous thing, for 17.”22 Here the novice is left in the

22

Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939: From
the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, 84.
10

dust. There is no straightforward projection of the process-of-constructing-a-pentagon to
the process-of-constructing-a-heptacaidecagon.23 The two processes do not look
anything like each other (I had trouble even following the second one24). Yet we must say
that the man who invented the construction did, in fact, “do the analogous thing.” The
repartee with Alan Turing is worth quoting at length:
Wittgenstein: [Re: the man who invented the construction of a
heptacaidecagon (17-sided polygon)]: “Wasn’t he introducing a new mode of
projection? He invented a new mode of projection, which there is reason to call
so-and-so. He discovered a new kind of analogy.”
Turing: “It certainly isn’t a question of inventing what the word ‘analogous’
means; for we all know what ‘analogous’ means.”
Wittgenstein: Yes, certainly, it’s not a question merely of inventing what it [the
word ‘analogous’] is to mean. For if that were the problem, we could settle it
much easier by making ‘analogous’ mean ‘cushion’.
The point is indeed to give a new meaning to the word ‘analogous’. But it is not
merely that; for one is responsible to certain things. The new meaning must be
such that we who have had a certain training will find it useful in certain
ways.25
The phrase just quoted, “we who had a certain training will find it useful in certain
ways,” makes into a live question whether Wittgenstein meant to include or exclude
Turing in the “we!” A few lectures later he makes it quite clear that there is an enormous
difference between mathematical and non-mathematical tasks. “If it is a mathematical
task, you can go away and do it elsewhere.”26 But nearly all everyday tasks are nonmathematical in nature, because they are context-bound: If I lost my keys in the

23

Ibid., 65. “What is analogous…is a method of construction.” Emphasis added.
For a diagram see http://www.jimloy.com/geometry/17-gon.htm.
25
Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939: From
the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, 66. Emphasis added.
26
Ibid., 84.
24
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basement, I don’t search for them on the front lawn even if the light is much better.
Engineering is just such a context-bound enterprise. It is sensitivity to the possibility that
context matters for philosophical tasks that separates Wittgenstein from Turing.

2. Dynamical similarity
The difference in training—Wittgenstein in engineering, Turing in mathematics—
leads us to the second complex example of a method of projection. This second example
will yield the second engineering concept that frames Wittgenstein’s outlook.
The notion of “dynamical similarity” is present from the very beginning of
Wittgenstein’s corpus. It lies the passage in the Tractatus 4.40141 where Wittgenstein
speaks of the kind of projection involved in moving from a musical performance to the
printed score and back, as well as from performance to gramophone recording. We would
agree that the performance, score and gramophone were “similar”—i.e., it is the “same”
music in each case. If the similarity involved were of the run of the mill sort (called
dimensionless27), the estimation of sameness would be a mathematical task, one which
could be assessed from anywhere.28 But in fact, the similarity is dynamical in nature. In
short, the estimation of sameness is inextricably bound up with the skills of this human
(e.g., the musician) in this place. Consider, how many of us while faced with a large stack
of printed but untitled scores, could select the “same” unfamiliar music as the one being
27

If Jane is twice the height of her child, it does not matter whether height is measured in feet or
millimeters. “Dimensionless” similarity is the kind in which units of dimensions drop out when the ratio is
calculated.
28
Wittgenstein-the-engineer insisted in inserting dimensions into the thermodynamic text he used.
P. D. M. Spelt and Brian McGuinness, “Marginalia in Wittgenstein’s Copy of Lamb’s Hydrodynamics,” in
From the Tractatus to the Tractatus and Other Essays, ed. Gianluigi Oliveri (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang,
2001), 131-48.
12

performed? Now imagine you are the very instrument of transcription: “Here is a pen and
blank score; project the performed music onto the score.” The method of projection
involved can only be said to pass through your skills as the musical transcriber.29
Similarly, we feel the inextricability of human skills from the method of projection if,
while attending the symphony in pre-Edison days, we are charged with capturing the
sound mechanically by inventing a machine to do so (a gramophone).
If we succeed in transcribing the music; if we succeed in capturing the symphony
onto wax or vinyl, we will clearly be qualified to judge the performance, the score and the
LP record as all of the “same” symphony. But we will be using the word “same” in a
privileged way, one unavailable to those who lack skills. Estimation of sameness under
these conditions cannot be done, “from sideways on” as it might when we compare a
portrait painting to its original. In light of the full range of examples, we see that words
like “same,” “similar,” and “analogous” are, from the engineering outlook, not univocal
terms.
For instance, if I say the word ‘picture’, you would think first and foremost of
something drawn or painted and, say, hung up on a wall. You would not think
of Mercator’s projection of a globe; still less of the sense in which a man’s
handwriting is a picture of his character. A word has one or more nuclei of uses
which come into everybody’s mind first; so that if one says so-and-so is also a
picture—a map, or Darstellung in mathematics—in this lies a comparison: as it
were, “Look at this as a continuation of that.30

29

I am indebted to Susan Sterrett for this discussion. Following her lead, I have also written about the
parallel problem facing engineering circa 1906, namely that of how to scale up the Pénaud Flyer, a toy
whirligig that actually flew, into a manned helicopter. See Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of
Models of Wings and Models of the World. And then see Brad J. Kallenberg, “Dynamical Similarity and the
Problem of Evil,” in God, Grace and Creation: The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society 2009,
Vol. 55, ed. Philip J. Rossi (University of Notre Dame: 2010), 163-83.
30
Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939: From
the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, 240.
13

3. Satisfactoriness
In PI §43, we find Wittgenstein’s famous definition of meaning : “the meaning of a
word is its use.” At least that is how it us usually quoted. I’ve intentionally skipped over
the crucial bit, so let me read it more carefully: “For a large class of cases—though not for
all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.” Crucial for my argument is this phrase: “though not for
all.” The fact that both we and his commentators tend to misremember the quotation is
evidence of tendencies shared by both sides of the debate. Those who are Wittgenstein
fans long for a totalizing theory from him that covers all the cases and puts everything to
right; those who are his enemies hope to catch him at falsely purporting a totalizing
theory. But Wittgenstein-the-engineer is not interested in totalizing claims any more
than he is in building a bridge privately in his mind. Wittgenstein is speaking like an
engineer when he writes
If I tell someone “Stand roughly here”—may not this explanation work
perfectly? And can every other one fail too?
But isn’t this an inexact explanation?—Yes; why shouldn’t we call it
“inexact”? Only let us understand what “inexact” means. For it does not mean
“unusable.”31
In engineering, the relevant metric of correctness is always a function of the nature of the
given case. For example, when can a cylinder be said to “fit” a hole? Only when it is stuck
tightly? Well, yes, if you are making a wooden boat and the dowel must hold out water;
but no if you are boring an engine’s cylinder to receive a piston, it must slide freely
31

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §88.
14

(though not loosely). And somewhere between these two notions of “fit” will be needed if
you are building a child’s toy in which a dowel must be sticky enough to need a toy
hammer to pound it flush, and then flipped over to be pounded flush from the other side,
and so on endlessly to the child’s delight.32 The relevant notion of “fit” is relative to the
given project. Such is always the case in engineering design.
Wittgenstein was no stranger to engineering design. (Recall the propeller patent
devised just after WWI and the useful medical gadget devised during WWII.) By means of
the complex activity of “design,” engineers respond to a particular context-bound
problem. More often than not, the problem will be “wicked.” In the context of
engineering design, “wicked “ is a technical term. A wicked problem is one whose
solution, if it exists at all, is compelled by no finite set of conditions nor optimizable
across the board.33 It is this concept of design-as-response-to-a-wicked-problem that
escapes the polar opposites of the one and the many. On the one hand, it is not the case
that a design problem has one and only one correct solution. Quite to the contrary, any
given design problem, being the highly contextual critter it is, has multiple acceptable
responses possible, each response competing against others in a chaotic field where no
single metric governs all contenders.34 Consequently, every design is an inevitable
compromise between this sort of usefulness and that sort of usefulness. Admittedly our
brains chafe against this hurly-burly and we tend to conclude, “Then, anything goes?!”

32

Ibid., §182.
The 10 or so marks of “wicked” design problems are detailed by Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M.
Webber, “Planning Problems Are Wicked Problems,” in Developments in Design Methodology, ed. Nigel
Cross (Chichester & New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 135-44.
34
I owe this insight to Koen’s careful study. Billy Vaughn Koen, Discussion of the Method; Conducting
the Engineer’s Approach to Problem Solving (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
33
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No. For on the other hand, some responses are clearly wrong (obviously the ones that
don’t work, but also for the ones that don’t work “well”). Thus the engineering outlook:
Within the middle range of roughly acceptable designs, each proposed design is assessed
against others for its relative satisfactoriness.35

By way of summarizing what I’m calling here Wittgenstein’s “engineering outlook,”
listen again to Wittgenstein’s reply to Turing. Recall that the order here is, given the
construction of a pentagon, “do the analogous thing” for a heptacaidegon. Turing-themathematician has just said “…for we all know what ‘analogous’ means.”
The point is indeed to give a new meaning to the word ‘analogous’. But it is not
merely that; for one is responsible to certain things. The new meaning must be
such that we who have had a certain training will find it useful in certain ways.36
Wittgenstein’s reply displays his engineering outlook: for one is responsible to
certain things.” What things? Engineering design is obviously beholden to the material
conditions of a given problem. Which is to say, engineering problems are not
mathematical tasks, they cannot be taken elsewhere for solving. But of course, material
conditions fall far short of compelling this or that solution. Many working responses are
possible. Granted, a seasoned design team instinctively pays scant attention to the
majority of proposals and zeroes in on a handful of possibilities. Yet their thinning of the
field is not random, because those who do the thinning have had “a certain training.”
Those who are adequately trained have an “eye” that can be trusted. Justification for a
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given exercise of embodied skill may in some cases be given. But such a justification
would only be fully understood by someone of equally advanced training, the very one
who may recognize the move for what it is and therefore, not ask for further justification.
In other words, there are masters as well as novices. This kind of mastery [Beherrschung],
namely the ascendancy to the rank of expert practitioner (e.g., musicians, surgeons, and
athletes as well as engineers) is what Wittgenstein alludes to with the oft-repeated phrase
“ ‘mastery’ [‘beherrschen’] of a technique.”37 He’s not talking about something like
learning to master the bicycle, something virtually everybody has done or can learn—but
the mastery of things that only timeful intense participation in a social practice can
deliver.38

Part II. Wittgenstein and Religious Pluralism
I have argued thus far that three concepts employed by Wittgenstein are really
engineering concepts and that Wittgenstein likely employed them in the way an engineer
would.39 In this present section I will show how an engineer’s view of these same three
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terms may shed light on what can and what cannot be said about Wittgenstein’s putative
“fideism.” I will not argue directly that the charge of fideism is faulty, a task that Stephen
Mulhall has set for himself in a recent paper.40 Rather, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s
engineering outlook meant that he did not see the world in a way that allows the charge
of fideism even to make sense.

a. Fideism and methods of projection
In the Third Lecture on religious belief, a student named Smythies misunderstands
Wittgenstein’s excursus on reference. Wittgenstein says what justifies my belief that my
thought of “my brother in America”41 is really about my brother in America involves a
“method of projection.” Because we think we already know what “method of projection”
entails, we forget that Wittgenstein is speaking in engineering terms. Wittgenstein
summarizes his point by saying “We associate a particular use with a picture.” (71)
Smythies, counters, “This isn’t all he does—associate a use with a picture.” To which
Wittgenstein snaps, “Rubbish”! Smythies misunderstands Wittgenstein in at least two
ways. In the first place, he thinks of a picture simply, univocally, as a portrait. Poor
Smythies! Perhaps this is the only kind of picture he has ever encountered. If, as Smythies
seems to imagine, religion employs portraits of God, then “what conclusions can be
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drawn?” Wittgenstein needles him: “Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in connection
with the Eye of God?”42
Smythies second error is linked to the first. Because he can only think of portraits,
he can only think of “use” as something added on and ultimately disconnected from (i.e.,
externally related to) the picture itself. Wittgenstein’s response (“Rubbish!”) to Smythies’
remark (“this isn’t all he does….”), indicates that Smythies seems to think that a lot of
things are going, and one of these goings-on is the association of uses with pictures. But
Smythies’ presupposition undermines the point that Wittgenstein is making about the
internal relation between pictures and use. For Smythies, a use is selected (from a range
of possible uses) and the linked to the picture by the agent. For example, I can admire a
painting, copy a painting, tell a story about a painting. But admiring, copying, and storytelling are not the kind of uses Wittgenstein has in mind. The alternative kind of “use”
Wittgenstein-the-engineer has in mind means nothing apart from the picture; an
engineering “picture” is intelligible as an engineering picture only in connection with a
method of projection.43 But Smythies is unaware of this sort of integral connection. He
evidently thinks that using a portrait as a wall decoration (use #1) and using the same
portrait to identify a person at the train station (use #2) are the kinds of uses
Wittgenstein means. But Smythies’ examples are one and the same use: picture-asportrait. What Smythies cannot see is that his comment shows him already to be
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committed to a single use (or, a single method of projection) bound up with his all too
familiar concept of picture-as-portrait.
In order for Smythies to uptake the complex notion of “use” Wittgenstein has in
mind, he (and we) must first be freed from the grip of picture-as-portrait. To recall an
earlier lecture, non-portraits can conceivably be used as portraits. Wittgenstein opened
the Lecture on The Foundation of Mathematics with the thought experiment of using a
smiley face for locating G.E. Moore at the train station!44 Conversely, the diagram
depicting the construction of a pentagon can be used emblematically for the construction
of the heptacaidegon. But in these instances, the pictures involved are decidedly not
portraits.
“How is the connection made?—We imagine first a connection like strings.”45 Of
course, this is where Smythies is stuck. (Lines of correspondence can be strung between
G.E. Moore’s eyes and the eyes of the smiley face. But what of Moore’s nose?) But the
lights go on for the student named Lewy, “The connection is a convention. The word
designates.” Well, convention yes—at least sort of. But “designate”? No, that is still
bewitching. Affirming that he is on the right track, Wittgenstein replies to Lewy, “You
must explain ‘designates’ by examples.”46 There are multiple ways to “designate” just as
there are in engineering multiple methods of projection. But Lewy is on to something
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with the notion of “convention,” because conventions are both social (more than me) and
timeful in the sense that the novice joins that which preceded him or her.47
For the next page and a half Wittgenstein mulls over the possibility that what
enables the phrase “my brother in America” to work is a “connection by convention” (68).
“There is a connection by convention—what do we mean? –This connection refers to
events happening at various times. Most of all, it refers to a technique.” (68)
Again the danger looms. When non-engineers, especially those of us who imagine
themselves to be close to engineering but were trained instead in mathematics and hard
sciences, hear the word “technique,” we think in terms of works-every-time and one-sizefits-all. But for Wittgenstein whose engineering education was tied closely to the handson practices of mechanic, bricoleur, and craftsman, technique is never a one-size-fits-all.
Rather, all “techniques” are heuristics, rules of thumb that require skilled judgment and
on-the-spot revisions.48 Any given “technique” had to be skillfully employed from within a
field of competing, and sometimes contradictory, heuristics. This social nature of
engineering techne—that skills are shared by practitioners and honed together over time
and most perfectly embodied by masters—is captured by Wittgenstein’s phrases repeated
throughout the excursus: “the practice of using,” “connection by convention,” “ method of
projection,” “a public instrument…functioning in a certain way,” “the technique of a
word,” and “a whole technique of usage” (67-71). In short, what enable the phrase “my
brother in America” to do work, is that the phrase is part of our game. And the important
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bit for my argument is this: If we happen to stand outside the “our” and hear another
speak of “my brother in America”—or for that matter, “my Father in heaven”—
Wittgenstein indicates that our only hope in making the connection is that “it must
become a part of our game.”49 And that may take time.50
It is crucial to emphasize that this comparison: “anything projects onto anything” is
categorically different that the statement “anything is analogous to anything.” As Jeffrey
Stout has argued, in the second statement the only thing it takes to make an analogy is a
thin enough description of the things being compared!51 But notice that Stout’s “rhetoric
of thin description” presupposes that analogy is analogy is analogy: the activity of forming
the analogy is always the same, while the descriptions vary in thickness. But for
Wittgenstein-the-engineer, the method of projection is itself the thing that differs from
case to case (recall: “analogy” is itself not a univocal term). Since one must attain a degree
of mastery before one can understand a given method of projection (technique), and
mastery takes time, there simply is no way to pronounce in advance whether two methods
of projection (or two religious pictures) are on the one hand genuine rivals or on the
other, insulated from criticism as fideism implies. On such a point Wittgenstein remained
mute.

b. Fideism and Dynamical Similarity
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As with “method of projection,” the notion of dynamical similarity also gestures to
the sheer time needed for a novice to achieve the skills internal to a craft. But here I want
to emphasize the skills required for judgment of sameness. Only those who are in the
process of learning mastery of the appropriate method of projection are qualified to assess
“sameness” and only then in proportion to how much progress they have made to date.
For example, since we all have mastered well enough the techniques of Euclidian planar
geometry, none of us have any trouble affirming “All squares are similar” and in special
cases that two squares are “the same,” or congruent. In such cases, a criterion of sameness
can be explicitly spelled out (even if such criterion is really intelligible only to those who
have already some mastery of the relevant method of projection). But if one lacks mastery
of the relevant method of projection, is one thereby justified in affirming sameness?
Oonly by fides implicitas.)
Suppose you are called in to arbitrate a case of musical plagiarism. A particularly
prolific pianist has been churning out CD after CD and has now been called up on charges
of having pirated another’s recording of Rachmaninoff’s Concerto No. 3 and is selling it as
her own. Obviously, the two performances are similar—they are both of the Rach 3. They
may even be very similar—down to issues of rhythm and volume. But are they the same?
To your ears, and mine, the two recordings may sound identical. But as Wittgenstein
alluded in the Tractatus, projecting music from score to performance involves finer
distinctions that you and I as not-musicians are trained to make. When Schumann wrote
the curious marginal direction to would-be performers, “Play as if from far away,” his
instructions meant more than simply “play softly”—or so I’m told by expert musicians; for
23

I don’t know.52 And that is my point.53 (My wife, a musician by training, once observed
that when music comes from far way prevents one from hearing what key it is in! This
feature may make far away music quite different than from that which is simply played
softly.)
Once again, we are brought up short when asking whether two religions are “the
same” (i.e., occupy enough of the same conceptual space for comparison); whether two
religious practices are “the same”; whether two religious utterances are “the same.” J. L.
Mackie says “God does not exist.” Søren Kierkegaard says “God does not exist.”54 Are they
saying the same thing? Wittgenstein-the-engineer warns that anyone lacking mastery in
the respective techniques of projection also lacks warrant for thinking these two claims
are the same. When Wittgenstein wrote famously that “practice gives the words their
sense,”55 he not only meant their practice. He meant our practice For the reliability of my
conclusions about whether another’s utterance means the same as when I say it is a
function of my progress in the skills of the relevant method of projection.
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c. Fideism and “satisfactoriness”
If Wittgenstein instinctively saw the world through the engineering eyes, then like
any competent designer, he would have both denied that there is “at most one” solution
and denied that “anything goes.” I maintain that this holds true for his views on religion
and ethics.
Now, there is plenty of evidence that show he eschews “at most one” view of religion
and ethics.56 So I won’t belabor that point. At stake for my argument is whether there is
any reason to suggest Wittgenstein stops short of outright fideism.
If Wittgenstein’s engineering outlook endured throughout his entire life, it seems
natural to expect Wittgenstein-the-engineer to eschew an “anything goes” position
toward religion. Recall the words of PI §43, “for a large class of cases—though not for
all….” In principle, there may be many satisfactory solutions to a design problem; though
not for all. In practice there are many religions in the world, and in principle many other
possible ones as well; though not for all. Perhaps the following example can clarify this
last point.
Elizabeth Anscombe once asked Wittgenstein how he would respond to a
Cambridge friend who went in for witch-doctoring, like you or I might go in for
chemotherapy. Would he try to stop him? “He though about this for a little and said, ‘Yes,
but I don’t know why’.”57 Three observations. First, Anscombe does not pose this as a
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theoretical problem.58 Anscombe knows better than to ask Wittgenstein to pronounce
whether witch-doctoring per se is a bunch of hooey. But since Anscombe admits that the
view of On Certainty seems to suggest that “there can be no such thing as ‘rational
grounds’ for criticizing practices and beliefs that are so different than our own,”59 she
wants to know whether Wittgenstein’s position precludes any opposition to the friend. So
she poses a particular kind of defeater to a general prohibition against witch-doctoring:
would Wittgenstein talk this friend out of it? Anscombe’s question invites Wittgenstein
to imagine a conversation that might ensue between him and the friend. It is important
to see that Wittgenstein can indeed envision beginning such a conversation. As far as
Wittgenstein was concerned, a conversation can always begin, even if, after a time, we
might no longer “find our feet” with the other. In the place of a general theory about
witch-doctoring, Wittgenstein trusts in the possibilities of conversation.60 Of course, no
conversation begins tabula rasa: each person brings skills and dispositions to the table.
Wittgenstein knows he brings to the conversation an experience-formed disposition—in
this instance, the disposition to dissuade the friend from visiting a witch-doctor. But
importantly, his disposition is not to desist from conversation entirely.
Second, Anscombe’s line of inquiry presumes that meddling in other’s beliefs and
actions is sometimes in order. By speaking with the friend, Wittgenstein would aim to
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change his friend’s way of thinking. Now, when Kai Nielsen reads that Wittgenstein’s
ideal is one of “coolness”61 that “leaves everything as it is,”62 Nielsen seems to assume that
Wittgenstein’s method necessarily entails “hands off” and “to each his own.” It is logically
possible, of course, that Wittgenstein’s admission to Anscombe is evidence of
inconsistency. However, Wittgenstein’s explicit intention is to perform therapies.63
Wittgenstein once wrote to Norman Malcolm “What is the use of studying philosophy if
all that it does for you is enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse
questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important
questions of everyday life...?”64 Sometimes intervention is called for.
Third, in good engineering form, Wittgenstein gives to Anscombe an answer that is
clearly provisional. His current disposition is to oppose witch-doctoring. But in the same
breath his admits “I don’t know why.” In admitting uncertain grounds for his disposition,
Wittgenstein is gesturing toward the engineer instinct to reserve final action until one
can “look and see.” Depending upon what one sees, one may act in a way contrary to the
initial disposition.65 It has been the argument of this present paper that Wittgenstein’s
engineering outlook prevented him from settling anything in advance. If an engineer has
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water seepage in the basement, he or she might undertake its repair. Then again, it might
be more satisfactory to leave it alone. But there is no way to decide the best course of
action in advance any more than it is possible to build a bridge without a site visit. One
must first “look and see.”66 Wittgenstein’s response to Anscombe is provisional precisely
because more is needed. However, what is needed is not more data or more time to
theorize, but more actual conversation with the friend.
In leveling a charge of fideism, Kai Nielsen seems to envision two mutually exclusive
positions. Either one opposes witch-doctoring with hard-hitting reasoning that reveal it
to be a mistake. Opposite this is fideism (or Nielsen’s caricature of it) for which all things
are permitted. If Wittgenstein is the fideist that Nielsen accuses him to be, there can be
no good reason for bothering even to begin to converse; what could one possible hope to
accomplish? Wittgenstein-the-engineer defies Nielsen’s categories. Engineers are called
upon to give a satisfactory response to an always poorly understood problem with too few
resources at hand in a particular context armed only with whatever skilled reflexes one
has cultivated to date. Which is to say, until particulars present themselves—Anscombe’s
question is, at this instant, hypothetical—Wittgenstein-the-engineer follows his nose.67
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